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TRUTHINESS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Ilya Shapiro, Trevor Burrus, and Gabriel Latner* 
I.  INTRODUCTION TO THE INTRODUCTION 
Believe it or not, Ohio has a law that criminalizes knowingly or reck-
lessly making “false” statements about a political candidate or a ballot ini-
tiative.1  We could hardly believe it too, when we first heard about this all-
too-serious tomfoolery in the context of Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 
a federal lawsuit which the Supreme Court agreed to hear during its 2013–
14 term.2 
For dogged supporters of the First Amendment such as the Cato Insti-
tute, Ohio’s law seems like it was ripped from the pages of Orwell’s 1984.  
What’s more, around 20 states have similar laws.3  We couldn’t let this 
barking dog lie, and quickly decided to get involved, first by joining the In-
stitute for Justice’s excellent brief at the cert stage, and then by going our 
own way on the merits. 
But that’s nothing special; in recent years, Cato has filed 30–45 amicus 
briefs every Supreme Court term (about half at the cert stage, half on the 
merits).  What is special is the attention that our merits brief has garnered.4  
Although Cato lawyers and scholars have been central to debates over 
 
*   Ilya Shapiro is a senior fellow in constitutional studies at the Cato Institute, where Trevor Burrus 
and Gabriel Latner are, respectively, a research fellow and a legal associate.  The authors are also 
members of the Justice League, and thank Superman for his tireless efforts to protect Truthiness, 
Justice, and the American Way.  This essay is adapted from the authors’ amicus brief on behalf 
of Cato and P.J. O’Rourke in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, which is available at http://
object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/sba-list-merits-filed-brief.pdf.  All errors are the fault 
of the reader. 
 1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.21(B) (West 1995). 
 2 525 F. App’x 415 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S.Ct. 895 (2014) (No. 13-193), to be argued 
Apr. 22, 2014, with a decision expected by the end of the term in June.  Curiously, the case as-
cended to the Court around the time that President Obama’s infamous claim that the Affordable 
Care Act ensures that “if you like your health care plan you can keep it” was publicly adjudged 
to be the most blatant lie of his administration.  See infra note 36. 
 3 Aaron Marshall, Despite Laws Against Lying, Tall Tales Have Become the Norm on the Cam-
paign Trail, Experts Say, THE PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 27, 2012 (updated Oct. 29, 2012), available 
at http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/10/despite_laws_against_lying_tal.html. 
 4 See, e.g., David Lat, Best Amicus Brief Ever, ABOVE THE LAW (Mar. 3, 2014, 1:27 PM), http://
abovethelaw.com/2014/03/best-amicus-brief-ever/; Is It Wise to Criminalize Lies?, ECONOMIST, 
Mar. 8, 2014, available at http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21598683-challenging-
buckeye-states-ban-political-mudslinging-it-wise-criminalise-lies. 
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many issues, and our briefs are often referenced by legal analysts (and oc-
casionally cited by the Court), never before has one of our briefs generated 
this much attention.  While well aware that a brief ought to stand on its 
own—and that a joke that needs explaining isn’t funny—this brief was suf-
ficiently different from our usual output that we thought it merited some 
modest explanation before re-publishing as a law review article (with light 
edits for context). 
While humor isn’t unheard of at the Supreme Court, it’s generally as-
sumed to be the sole province of the Justices. Whether it’s Justice Thomas 
poking fun at a particular Ivy League law school5 or all the Justices trying 
to wrap their heads around whether isolating a gene is more like (a) making 
a baseball bat, (b) mining gold, or (c) baking cookies,6 laughter often inter-
rupts oral arguments.7  Nor are the Court’s opinions devoid of creative non-
fiction; Chief Justice Roberts has used Bob Dylan lyrics to illustrate his rul-
ings8 and once issued an opinion written in the style of a pulp-noir 
detective novel.9 
Indeed, despite humor being so prevalent at the Court that it has been 
the subject of several studies,10 the Court’s official Guide for Advocates 
cautions that “[a]ttempts at humor usually fall flat.”11  So why risk making 
fools of ourselves by breaking with custom to write a brief that, while fun-
ny enough in parts—and particularly in footnotes—probably won’t gener-
ate invitations to host a late-night talk show or emcee the White House 
Correspondents’ Dinner?12 
 
 5 Nick Wing, Clarence Thomas Joke Revealed in its Entirety in Complete Supreme Court Tran-
script, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2013, 7:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/24/
clarence-thomas-joke_n_2541601.html. 
 6 Transcript of Oral Argument at 4:8, 35:9, 37:22, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Ge-
netics,  133 S.Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398). 
 7 Boston University law professor Jay Wexler actually tracks the number of times “[laughter]” 
appears in oral argument transcripts.  See generally Supreme Court Humor, http://www.jaywex.
com/pages/Supreme%20Court%20Humor%20Page.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
 8 Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 301 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 9 From the Chief Justice, a Novel Dissent, WASH. POST, Oct. 15 2008 (quoting Pennsylvania v. 
Dunlap, 129 S.Ct. 448 (2008)),  available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/10/14/AR2008101402818.html. 
 10 See, e.g., Tal Koplan, Supreme Court, Now With More Humor, POLITICO (Oct. 29, 2013, 6:42 
PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/10/supreme-court-now-with-more-
humor-176233.html; Ryan A. Malphurs et al., Too Much Frivolity Not Enough Femininity:  A 
Study of Gender and Humor at the U.S. Supreme Court, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK, Oct. 3, 2013, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2335613; Adam Liptak, A Taxonomy of Supreme Court 
Humor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/25/us/
25bar.html. 
 11 CLERK OF THE COURT, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., GUIDE FOR COUNSEL IN CASES TO BE 
ARGUED BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (2013), available at http://
www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/guideforcounsel.pdf. 
 12 One of us (Shapiro) has appeared on The Colbert Report, but he of course played the straight 
man.  See The Colbert Report (Comedy Central television broadcast July 8, 2010), available at 
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Most important to our decision was the fact that this was really the only 
case where such a brief could not only be appropriate, but effective.  As 
Canadians,13 we look to one of our own for explanation:  Marshall McLu-
han’s idea that “the medium is the message.”  Faced with a law that threat-
ened to silence political humorists, we could have simply cataloged high-
lights from the greats in the genre—from Twain and Mencken to Stewart 
and Colbert.  But the visceral experience of making someone laugh is infi-
nitely more powerful than merely describing to them the academic concept 
of humor. 
So why did we do it?  We did it because we could.  We did it because 
since its founding, this country has held as one of its cardinal principles the 
right of the people to castigate and mock their leaders.  The monarchic cul-
ture that the Founders chose to break from recognized a speech-crime 
known as lèse-majesté:  any speech or action that insulted the monarchy or 
offended its dignity was an act of treason.  Lest European monarchs grow 
too proud, however, they would appoint court jesters.  These “licensed 
fools” were granted a special dispensation permitting them to mock their 
monarchs without fear of death.  Like the slave riding behind a Roman 
general, the Fool’s role was to remind the king that he too was mortal. 
Why did we write the brief?  Because in America, lèse-majesté is not a 
crime; we each have the right to be as foolish as we wish.  Ohio’s law 
threatens that sacred right, undermining the First Amendment’s protection 
of the serious business of making politics funny.  We just had to show how 
silly that is. 
II.  INTRODUCTION 
“I am not a crook.” 
“Read my lips:  no new taxes!” 
“I did not have sexual relations with that woman.” 
“Mission accomplished.” 
“If you like your healthcare plan, you can keep it.” 
While George Washington may have been incapable of telling a lie,14 
his successors haven’t had the same integrity.  The campaign promise (and 
its subsequent violation), as well as disparaging statements about one’s op-
ponent (whether true, mostly true, mostly not true, or entirely fantastic), are 
cornerstones of American democracy.  Indeed, mocking and satire are as 
 
http://thecolbertreport.cc.com/videos/zjdl0i/automatics-for-the-people—ilya-shapiro—jackie-
hilly. 
 13 Only two of us are truthfully—as opposed to truthily—Canadian, but the third is from Colorado, 
which is close enough given that state’s liberal drug policy, climate, and fondness for winter 
sports. 
 14 Apocryphal. 
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old as America.  If you don’t believe us, just ask Thomas Jefferson, “the 
son of a half-breed squaw, sired by a Virginia mulatto father.”15  Or ponder, 
as Grover Cleveland was forced to, “Ma, ma, where’s my pa?”16 
In modern times, “truthiness”—a “truth” asserted “from the gut” or be-
cause it “feels right,” without regard to evidence or logic17—is a key part of 
political discourse.  It’s difficult to imagine life without it, and our political 
discourse is weakened by Orwellian laws that try to prohibit it. 
After all, where would we be without the knowledge that Democrats are 
pinko-communist flag-burners who want to tax churches and use the mon-
ey to fund abortions so they can use the fetal stem cells to create pot-
smoking lesbian ATF agents who will steal all the guns and invite the UN 
to take over America?  Voters have to decide whether we’d be better off 
electing Republicans, those hateful, assault-weapon-wielding maniacs who 
believe that George Washington and Jesus Christ incorporated the nation 
after a Gettysburg reenactment and that the only thing wrong with the death 
penalty is that it isn’t administered quickly enough to secular-humanist pro-
fessors of Chicano studies. 
Everybody knows that the economy is better off under [Republi-
can/Democratic]18 presidents—who control it directly with big levers in the 
Oval Office—and that: 
President Obama is a Muslim. 
President Obama is a Communist. 
President Obama was born in Kenya. 
Nearly half of Americans pay no taxes.19 
One percent of Americans control 99 percent of the world’s wealth. 
Obamacare will create death panels. 
Republicans oppose immigration reform because they’re racists. 
The Supreme Court is a purely political body that’s evangelically [liber-
al/conservative].20 
All of the above statements could be considered “truthy,” yet all contribute 
to our political discourse. 
 
 15 Son of a Halfbreed Indian Squaw (Quotation), THOMAS JEFFERSON’S MONTICELLO, http://www.
monticello.org/site/son-half-breed-indian-squaw-quotation (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
 16 Answer:  “Gone to the White House, ha ha ha!”  Elisabeth Donnelly, Ye Olde Sex Scandals:  
Grover Cleveland’s Love Child, THE AWL (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.theawl.com/2010/02/ye-
olde-sex-scandals-grover-clevelands-love-child. 
 17 The Word—Truthiness, in The Colbert Report:  Stone Phillips (Comedy Central television 
broadcast Oct. 17, 2005), available at http://thecolbertreport.cc.com/videos/63ite2/the-word—
truthiness; see also Definition of Truthiness, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/
browse/truthiness (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
 18 Circle as appropriate. 
 19 47 percent to be exact, though it may be higher by now. 
 20 Again, pick your truth. 
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The Ohio law challenged in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, and 
others like it that criminalize “false” speech, don’t replace truthiness, satire, 
and snark with high-minded ideas and “just the facts.”  Instead, they chill 
speech such that spin becomes silence.  More importantly, Ohio’s ban of 
lies and damn lies21 is inconsistent with the First Amendment. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that political speech, including 
and especially speech about politicians, merits the highest level of protec-
tion.22  Indeed, quite recently the Court held that the First Amendment pro-
tects outright lies with as much force as the truth.23 
It is thus axiomatic—not merely truthy—that speech may only be re-
stricted or regulated where doing so is necessary to further a compelling 
state interest.  But the government has no compelling interest in eliminating 
truthiness from electioneering and, even if such an interest existed, such 
laws are unnecessary because any injury that candidates suffer from false 
statements is best redressed by pundits and satirists—and if necessary, civil 
defamation suits.  Nor is the government well-suited for evaluating when a 
statement crosses the line into falsehood.24 
Ohio’s law blatantly violates the First Amendment and directly con-
flicts with Alvarez.  The Supreme Court should terminate it with extreme 
prejudice. 
III.  TRUTHINESS, INSINUATIONS, AND ALLEGATIONS ARE VITAL TO 
POLITICS 
In the hotly contested election of 1828, supporters of John Quincy Ad-
ams called Andrew Jackson a “slave-trading, gambling, brawling murder-
er.”25  Jackson’s supporters responded by accusing Adams of having pre-
marital sex with his wife and playing the role of a pimp by securing a 
prostitute for Czar Alexander I.26 
During Thomas Jefferson’s presidency, James T. Callender, a pam-
phleteer and “scandalmonger,” alleged that Jefferson had fathered numer-
 
 21 We’re unsure how much torture statistics can withstand before they too run afoul of the law. 
 22 See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992) (“[T]he First Amendment has its fullest 
and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.”) (quoting 
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
 23 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2539 (2012) (“[F]alsity alone may not suffice to 
bring the speech outside the First Amendment.”). 
 24 Two Pinocchios out of four is OK, but three is illegal? 
 25 Mac McClelland, Ten Most Awesome Presidential Mudslinging Moves Ever, MOTHER JONES 
(Oct. 31, 2008, 11:45 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2008/10/ten-most-awesome-
presidential-mudslinging-moves-ever. 
 26 Id. 
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ous children with his slave Sally Hemings.27  Callender’s allegations would 
feature prominently in the election of 1804, but it wasn’t until nearly two 
centuries later that the allegations were substantially confirmed.28 
More recently, we’ve had discussions of draft-dodging, Swift Boats, 
and lying about birthplaces29—not to mention the assorted infidelities that 
are a political staple.  Any one of these allegations, if made during an Ohio 
election, could be enough to allow a complaint to be filed with the Ohio 
Election Commission (OEC), turning commonplace political jibber-
jabber30 into a protracted legal dispute. 
When political arguments—however infantile—become legal disputes, 
the public is denied an important part of political speech:  responses to 
those allegations.  “If there be time to expose through discussion the false-
hood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the rem-
edy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”31  Inflammatory, 
insulting, and satirical speech is more likely to produce a response, thus 
making the back-and-forth of politics a self-correcting marketplace of ide-
as—except, of course, when candidates can tattle to the government, which 
then takes away their toys speech. 
The SBA List case began when Rep. Steven Driehaus responded to an 
advocacy group’s political attack32 by filing a complaint with the OEC.33  
Resources that could have been spent responding to the petitioner’s truth-
iness were thus redirected to a bizarre legal fight.  And this caused a ripple 
effect:  The Coalition Opposed to Additional Spending and Taxes felt suf-
ficiently chilled by Driehaus’s actions to refrain from engaging in the cam-
paign at all.34  Ohio’s law thus ultimately weakened the vibrancy of the 
state’s political discourse. 
Supporters of Ohio’s law believe that it will somehow stop the lies, in-
sults, and truthiness, raising the level of discourse to that of an Oxford Un-
 
 27 James Callender, THOMAS JEFFERSON’S MONTICELLO, http://www.monticello.org/site/research-
and-collections/james-callender (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
 28 Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemings: A Brief Account, THOMAS JEFFERSON’S MONTICELLO, 
http://www.monticello.org/site/plantation-and-slavery/thomas-jefferson-and-sally-hemings-brief-
account (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
 29 While President Obama isn’t from Kenya, he is a Keynesian—so you can see where the confu-
sion arises. 
 30 Or is it argle-bargle? 
 31 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927). 
 32 Driehaus voted for Obamacare, which the Susan B. Anthony List said was the equivalent of vot-
ing for taxpayer-funded abortion.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Susan B. Anthony List v. 
Driehaus, 525 F. App’x 415 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S.Ct. 895 (2014) (No. 13-193).  
We’re unsure how true the allegation is given that the healthcare law seems to change daily, but 
it certainly isn’t as truthy as calling a mandate a tax. 
 33 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 32, at 2. 
 34 Id. at 4. 
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ion debate.35  Not only does this Pollyannaish hope stand in the face of all 
political history, it disregards the fact that, in politics, truths are felt as 
much as they’re known.  When a red-meat Republican hears “Obama is a 
socialist,” or a bleeding-heart Democrat hears, “Romney wants to throw 
old women out in the street,” they are feeling a truth more than thinking 
one.  No government agency can change this fact, and any attempt to do so 
will stifle important political speech. 
IV.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTS TRUTHINESS, INSINUATIONS, AND 
ALLEGATIONS 
Many campaign statements cannot easily be categorized as simply 
“true” or “false.”  According to Politifact.com, President Obama’s claim 
that “if you like your health-care plan you can keep it” was true five years 
before it was named the “Lie of the Year.”36  More importantly, even if 
such a categorization could be made, false (and truthy) speech is protected 
by the First Amendment, especially if it’s political. 
In United States v. Alvarez, the Supreme Court held that there is no 
“general exception to the First Amendment for false statements.”37  In that 
case, the speech was entirely false, and there was no reasonable way to in-
terpret it as truthful.  Yet if Alvarez confirmed that the First Amendment 
protects even blatant lies made in the process of campaigning for office, 
surely it protects spin, parody, and truthiness. 
In declaring unconstitutional Washington’s equivalent ban on false 
campaign speech, that state’s supreme court held that the government’s 
claimed interest in prohibiting false statements of fact was invalid, in part 
because it “presupposes the State possesses an independent right to deter-
mine truth and falsity in political debate, a proposition fundamentally at 
odds with the principles embodied in the First Amendment.  Moreover, it 
naively assumes that the government is capable of correctly and consistent-
ly negotiating the thin line between fact and opinion in political speech.”38 
The U.S. Supreme Court has also held that as “neither factual error nor 
defamatory content suffices to remove the constitutional shield from criti-
cism of official conduct, the combination of the two elements is no less in-
adequate.  This is the lesson to be drawn from the great controversy over 
 
 35 One of us (Shapiro) has been to an Oxford Union debate; the level of discourse isn’t always that 
high. 
 36 Compare Obama’s Plan Expands Existing System, POLITIFACT (Oct. 9, 2008), http://www.
politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2008/oct/09/barack-obama/obamas-plan-expands-
existing-system, with Lie of the Year:  ‘If you like your health care plan, you can keep it,’ 
POLITIFACT (Dec. 12, 2013, 4:44 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2013/dec/
12/lie-year-if-you-like-your-health-care-plan-keep-it. 
 37 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012). 
 38 Rickert v. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 168 P.3d 826, 829 (Wash. 2007). 
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the Sedition Act of 1798.”39  By the same logic, false and defamatory 
statements about politicians’ backgrounds—including their voting rec-
ords—are also constitutionally protected.  Statements that are merely false, 
and not inherently defamatory, must therefore also be protected. 
Ohio’s law explicitly prohibits not merely defamatory falsehoods, but 
all of them—including the sort of self-promoting lies that the Alvarez Court 
held to be constitutionally protected.  And not only does it make no distinc-
tion between defamatory and non-defamatory statements, but the petition-
ers’ allegation could not have been inherently defamatory given that more 
than 78 percent of Americans favor legal abortion in at least some cases.40 
The SBA List case began with a claim—”Steve Driehaus voted to fund 
abortions”—that certainly could have caused consternation if uttered at a 
bar or dinner party.  Surreally, it ended up before the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Even worse, there is no question whether Driehaus voted for the bill at is-
sue; the only dispute is whether that bill actually provides federal funding 
for abortions—which is a question of legal, economic, and even theological 
interpretation. 
Statements of this kind—call them truthiness, spin, smear, or anything 
else—are as politically important as their factually pure counterparts.  De-
mocracy is based on the principle that the people elect representatives who 
reflect their beliefs and values, and whom they trust.  Beliefs drive democ-
racy—not some truth as adjudged by Platonic guardians—and there is no 
law that could make it otherwise.  Those voters who believed that Obamac-
are provides federal funding for abortion-on-demand (as many do) were 
told by the Susan B. Anthony List that one candidate had voted in favor of 
that law.  The voters’ beliefs were more important and relevant than the 
technical truths about the mechanics of the underlying legislation. 
Ohio’s law extends far beyond disputes over interpretation or implica-
tion.  Its broad language also criminalizes rhetorical hyperbole and political 
satire.  If, instead of a billboard reading “Driehaus voted for federally fund-
ed abortion,” the petitioners had erected a billboard that said “Driehaus is a 
baby killer” the law would apply with equal effect.  All the statute requires 
is:  (1) that the statement be false; (2) that the speaker knew the statement 
was false, or spoke with reckless disregard for the truth; and (3) that the 
statement was made with the intent of impacting the outcome of the elec-
tion.41  It is thus apparently illegal in Ohio for an outraged member of the 
public to call a politician a Nazi or a Communist—or a Communist Nazi, 
 
 39 N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964). 
 40 Abortion, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2014) 
(describing results from the latest poll, taken May 2013:  26 percent favoring legal abortion al-
ways, 52 percent sometimes, 20 percent never). 
 41 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.21(B) (West 1995). 
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for that matter.  That’s no exaggeration:  the law criminalizes a misstate-
ment made in “campaign materials,” including in “public speeches.”42 
It’s irrelevant that the law is limited to cases where the statements were 
made “knowingly” or with reckless disregard for the truth.  It wouldn’t be a 
total defense to any charge under the law to simply state, “I honestly 
thought this was true.”  Instead, some fact-finder (whether the OEC, a 
judge, or a jury) will have to determine (1) whether the statement was false, 
and (2) whether the defendant knew it was false, or spoke recklessly. 
The law also stifles, chills, and criminalizes political satire.  For exam-
ple, it’s a crime in Ohio for a late-night talk-show host to say:  “Candidate 
Smith is a drug-addled maniac who escaped from a mental institution.”  
Even satirists and speakers that are clearly attempting primarily to entertain 
their audiences are subject to prosecution if they intend or expect their 
statements to impact how the audience perceives a candidate.  A publica-
tion like The Onion—which regularly puts words in political figures’ 
mouths, or makes up outlandish stories about them—could be violating 
Ohio law by making people think at the same time it makes them laugh. 
This law is a paradigmatic example of a content-specific speech re-
striction that the First Amendment protects against.  Why should a false or 
exaggerated statement about a politician attract government sanction, when 
that same statement made about another public figure would not? 
The Alvarez Court expressed its concern that upholding the Stolen Val-
or Act “would endorse government authority to compile a list of subjects 
about which false statements are punishable.”43  Yet that is precisely what 
Ohio’s legislature has done.  While one subsection serves as a catch-all 
prohibition on all “false” statements made about a candidate,44 the majority 
of the section is devoted to a specific list of subjects about which false 
statements are punishable, including:  a candidate’s education (2); work 
history (3); criminal record (4-5); mental health (6); military service (7); 
and voting record (9). 
But wait, there’s more!  Refraining from stating (arguable) falsehoods 
is not enough to ensure compliance with the law.  For example, the regula-
tion of statements concerning a politician’s criminal record requires speak-
ers to actively take steps to avoid even the possibility of misinterpretation.  
If an Ohio political candidate has been indicted a dozen times on corruption 
and racketeering charges, you cannot lawfully say “Candidate Smith has 
been repeatedly indicted for corruption” without also saying how those in-
dictments were resolved.45  Even if the Supreme Court were to reverse it-
self and hold that false statements are outside the scope of First Amend-
 
 42 Id. 
 43 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012). 
 44 § 3517.21(B)(10). 
 45 § 3517.21(B)(5). 
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ment protection, there’s no question that truthful statements about candi-
dates’ criminal records are “at the core of our electoral process and of the 
First Amendment freedoms.”46 
There’s no reason why speech about these topics should be subject to 
regulation by the state, or why they should only be regulated for the benefit 
of politicians as opposed to other public figures—like actors, religious 
leaders, and famous athletes—who are often lied about.47  Nor are Ohio 
politicians so particularly thin-skinned that they require protection that 
politicians in other states do not.48  “Politics are politics, and it’s a big 
boys’ and big girls’ game.  That’s just the way it is.”49 
Those cases where the courts have allowed libel suits based on spurious 
statements about celebrities further demonstrate that the appropriate reme-
dy when it comes to lies about public figures is, if anything, a civil suit.50 
Courts have also limited the remedies states can provide to subjects of 
false speech.  It would be incoherent if states were allowed to apply crimi-
nal sanctions—as Ohio attempts to do here—for conduct to which the Con-
stitution only permits the attachment of compensatory liability.51 
While the mere fact that the courts have not recognized an exception to 
the First Amendment in the past doesn’t mean that such an exception 
doesn’t exist, the First Amendment requires that those advocating such an 
exception show “persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is 
part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription.”52  The 
Alvarez Court held that the government hadn’t proven a longstanding tradi-
tion of restricting false statements made by or about a political candidate.53  
If the historical record provides evidence of any longstanding tradition in 
 
 46 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968). 
 47 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that the First Amendment 
protects a magazine accusing a religious leader of a sexual relationship with his mother); Beck-
ham v. Bauer Publ’g Co., No. 10-cv-07980-R-SS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32269 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 
17, 2011) (a newspaper asserting a famous soccer player had cheated on his wife with a prosti-
tute was protected by both the First Amendment and anti-SLAPP statutes); N.Y. Times v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (protecting false statements about police officers’ conduct). 
 48 See, e.g., Judge Dismisses Libel Suit Against Tenn. Senator, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 26, 2013, 
available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/judge-dismisses-libel-case-against-tenn-
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arrested on drug charges). 
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 50 See, e.g., Burnett v. Nat’l Enquirer, 144 Cal. App. 3d 991 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (asserting that a 
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 51 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (concluding that even when the subject of false 
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 52 Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n,  131 S.Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011). 
 53 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012). 
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this regard, it’s the venerable practice of politicians’ lying about themselves 
and each other with complete impunity. 
V. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN POLITICAL HONESTY IS BEST SERVED BY 
PUNDITS AND SATIRISTS  
This country has a long and estimable history of pundits and satirists—
among whom Cato and P.J. O’Rourke can certainly be counted—exposing 
the exaggerations and prevarications of political rhetoric.  Even in the ab-
sence of the First Amendment, no government agency could do a better job 
policing political honesty than the myriad personalities and entities who 
make a living by exposing charlatans, mocking liars, lambasting arrogance, 
and unmasking truthiness. 
It was only two years ago that the Supreme Court agreed whole-
heartedly with that sentiment: 
The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true.  This is the ordinary 
course in a free society.  The response to the unreasoned is the rational; to the 
uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the simple truth.  See Whit-
ney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If 
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert 
the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, 
not enforced silence”).  The theory of our Constitution is “that the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market,” Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting).  The First Amendment itself ensures the right to respond to speech we 
do not like, and for good reason.  Freedom of speech and thought flows not 
from the beneficence of the state but from the inalienable rights of the person.  
And suppression of speech by the government can make exposure of falsity 
more difficult, not less so.  Society has the right and civic duty to engage in 
open, dynamic, rational discourse.  These ends are not well served when the 
government seeks to orchestrate public discussion through content-based man-
dates.54 
As Chief Judge Alex Kozinski wrote when Alvarez was before the 
Ninth Circuit, a prohibition on lying devalues the truth:  “How can you de-
velop a reputation as a straight shooter if lying is not an option?  Even if 
untruthful speech were not valuable for its own sake, its protection is clear-
ly required to give breathing room to truthful self-expression, which is un-
equivocally protected by the First Amendment.”55 
No one should be concerned that false political statements won’t be 
subjected to careful examination.  As the Court said in Brown v. Harlage, 
“a candidate’s factual blunder is unlikely to escape the notice of, and cor-
rection by, the erring candidate’s political opponent.  The preferred First 
Amendment remedy of ‘more speech, not enforced silence,’ thus has spe-
 
 54 Id. at 2550 (emphases added). 
 55 United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 675 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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cial force.”56  Recent technological advancements mean that statements by 
or about candidates will not just attract the attention of his or her oppo-
nents—instantly—but that of investigative journalists and professional fact 
checkers. 
Politicians who are caught lying about themselves or others regularly 
attract more attention from the press than the subject of the original lie.  
The typical outcome is that the lie or cover up becomes more important 
than the original accusation or offense.  And that dynamic predates 
smartphones and their latest “apps.”  The impeachment of President Clin-
ton wasn’t based on any sexual activities he might have engaged in with 
Monica Lewinsky, but over the attempt to cover it up.  Similarly, President 
Nixon’s resignation was prompted by his obfuscations rather than his or-
chestration of a third-rate burglary.  And if the reader isn’t yet convinced of 
this point, we have but two words more on the subject:  Anthony Weiner. 
If Ohio’s concern is that there are abundant lies being told in campaigns 
that escape media notice—and can’t be proven in a civil defamation suit—
wouldn’t that same lack of evidence hamstring prosecution under Ohio 
Rev. Code § 3517.21?  Anyone who could fabricate enough evidence to 
mislead all of the fact-checkers and investigators who scrutinize his fables 
could surely evade a charge under this law. 
Adding further penalties won’t dissuade successful and talented liars.  
The only way that such a law could offer the public greater protection from 
untruthful speech—accepting for the sake of argument that such protection 
is lawful, desirable, and necessary—would be if it adopted lower standards 
of proof than those required by civil defamation suits or newspaper editors. 
There’s no lie that can be told about a politician that won’t be more 
damaging to the liar once the truth is revealed.  A crushing send-up on The 
Daily Show or The Colbert Report will do more to clean up political rheto-
ric than the Ohio Election Commission ever could. 
Criminalizing political speech is no laughing matter, so the Court 
should strike down Ohio’s law. 
 
 56 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982) (quoting Whitney v. California, 275 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring)). 
